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Abstract
A Condorcet voting scheme chooses a winning candidate as one
who defeats all others in pairwise majority rule. We provide a review
which includes the rigorous mathematical treatment for calculating
the limiting probability of a Condorcet winner for any number of can-
didates and value of n odd or even and with arbitrary rank order
probabilities, when the voters are independent. We provide a com-
pact and complete Table for the limiting probability of a Condorcet
winner with three candidates and arbitrary rank order probabilities.
We present a simple proof of a result of May to show the limiting
probability of a Condorcet winner tends to zero as the number of can-
didates tends to infinity. We show for the first time that the limiting
probability of a Condorcet winner for any given number of candidates
m is monotone decreasing in m for the equally likely case. This, in
turn, settles the conjectures of Kelly and Buckley and Westen for the
case n → ∞. We prove the validity of Gillett’s conjecture on the
minimum value of the probability of a Condorcet winner for m = 3
and any n. We generalize this result for any m and n and obtain
the minimum solution and the minimum probability of a Condorcet
winner.
2
1 Introduction
Different voting procedures (see for example [22] Page 147) for electing a
leader or deciding a candidate or a judgment have been proposed in the
literature. In all voting procedures, we assume that the voter rank orders
the candidate or decision from highest to lowest. One of the most used
schemes is a majority rule, in which a candidate or decision is ranked first by
more than half the number of voters. An example of the majority rule is the
U.S. Supreme Court decisions. Another selection strategy is the plurality
rule in which a candidate is ranked first by the largest number of voters.
An example of the plurality rule is the U.S. presidential election. In the
Condorcet scheme, a candidate is chosen who defeats all others in pairwise
majority rule. An example of the Condorcet scheme is the selection of job
candidates or proposals to be funded in academic departments and by funding
agencies or for determining winners in tournaments.
While the Condorcet scheme is a transitive in individual voter’s choices,
there are many instances in which a majority winner may not exist [23][19].
For example, let there be 3 voters (V1, V2, V3) and 3 candidates (C1, C2, C3).
V1 rank orders C1C2C3, V2 rank orders C2C3C1 and finally V3 rank orders
C3C1C2. In this voting example, C1 is preferred over C2 two out of three
times. Similarly C2 is preferred over C3 and C3 is preferred over C1 two out
of three times. Hence there is no one with majority preferences over all pairs.
So according to the Condorcet scheme, there is no winner in this case.
In past research work, it has been assumed that a probability distribution
is given to all the rank orders. It is also assumed in most studies that all vot-
ers vote independently. Previous researchers have calculated the probability
of a Condorcet winner using analytical and simulation models [17] by mak-
ing simplifying assumptions on the probability distributions. Asymptotic
expressions for the limiting probability of a Condorcet winner (i.e., when the
number of voters → ∞) have been obtained [14] [12] [9] [23] [19]. A survey
of previous research in this area may be found in [10].
The focus of the present paper is on the limiting probability of a Con-
dorcet winner when the number of voters, n, tend to infinity for a given
number m of candidates and arbitrary probability distribution on the m!
rankings. We present a review and some new results in this part of the study.
While researchers in this area, notably for example, Niemi and Weisberg [23],
Garman and Kamien [9] have noted the relationship of the limit with certain
multivariate normal probabilities, there doesn’t exist a statistically rigorous
3
proof of this result in order to justify the evaluation of the limit for various
cases. Further it is often assumed that the number of candidates is odd, see
Niemi and Weisberg [23]. We close this gap with this paper by providing a
rigorous statistical proof for any number of candidates, the number of voters
both odd and even, and arbitrary probability distributions, usually referred
to as culture probabilities. In section 2, we show further that for any number
of candidates and with arbitrary probability distributions on the preference
ranking, the limiting probability depends on the calculation of positive or-
thant probabilities of appropriate multinormal distributions. We also provide
a compact and complete Table covering all possible cases for computing the
limiting probability of a Condorcet winner when the number of candidates
is 3 and with arbitrary probability distribution among the rank orders. We
show that the limiting probability as n→∞ for any number of candidates m
is monotone decreasing in m which partially validates Kelly [18] and Buckley
and Westen [4] conjectures. We also present a simple proof of May’s result
[19] that the limiting probability of a Condorcet winner for equally likely
case tends to zero as the number of candidates gets larger. We also prove
Gillett’s [15] conjecture on the minimum probability of a Condorcet number
for 3 candidates and any number of voters. We extend the result to any m
and n and obtain the minimum value and solution. In Section 5, we treat
the case of m = 4 candidates with arbitrary probabilities pi and show that
it is possible to have exact expressions for the limiting Condorcet winner
probability for all possible scenarios.
2 CondorcetWinner: Statistical Formulation
and Results for General Case
In this section, we present a statistical derivation of the limiting probability
of a Condorcet winner when the voters are independent and the number of
voters is large. Let
m = Number of Candidates
n = Number of Voters
We have K = m! preference rankings of m candidates. A voter will choose
one of these rankings. We assume that the voters act independently. Let pi
be the probability that a voter prefers the rank order i, for i = 1, 2, · · · , K.
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Further, we know that pi ≥ 0 and
K∑
i=1
pi = 1. Let Ni be the number of voters
voting for the ith preference ranking, for i = 1, 2, · · · , K. We therefore have
K∑
i=1
Ni = n. Now, it is well known that (N1, N2, · · · , NK) has a multinomial
distribution.
P (Ni = ni, i = 1, · · · , K) = n!
n1!n2! · · ·nK !
K∏
i=1
pnii (1)
where the ni’s are nonnegative integers with
K∑
i=1
ni = n.
It is known that (see, for example,[5] Page 318), for i = 1, · · · , K, j =
1, · · · , K and i 6= j.
E[Ni] = npi,
V ar[Ni] = npi(1− pi),
Covariance(Ni, Nj) = −npipj ,
Correlation(Ni, Nj) = −
√
pipj
(1− pi)(1− pj)
Denote the m candidates by C1, C2, · · · , Cm. Write CiPCj, i 6= j if Ci is
preferred to Cj by a voter. Define CiMCj , i 6= j if Ci beats Cj by majority
rule. i.e., the total number of voters preferring Ci to Cj is more than the
total number of voters preferring Cj to Ci. This fact can be mathematically
expressed as
a1,(i,j)N1 + a2,(i,j)N2 + · · ·+ aK,(i,j)NK ≥ 1 (2)
where the al,(i,j)’s are ± 1. al,(i,j) = 1, if in the lth preference ranking voted
by the Nl voters, CiPCj. Similarly al,(i,j) = − 1 if CjPCi is the preference
ranking voted by Nl voters. Clearly
K
2
of the al,(i,j)’s are 1 and
K
2
of the
al,(i,j)’s are equal to -1.
Equation (2) implies that the difference between the number of voters
preferring Ci to Cj and the number of voters preferring Cj to Ci is at least 1.
We define, for example, Ci to be the Condorcet winner if and only if CiMCj
for each j = 1, 2, · · · , m and j 6= i. For example, the probability that C1 is
the Condorcet winner is the probability of the joint event
a1,(1,2)N1 + a2,(1,2)N2 + · · ·+ aK,(1,2)NK ≥ 1
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a1,(1,3)N1 + a2,(1,3)N2 + · · ·+ aK,(1,3)NK ≥ 1
· · · ≥ 1
· · · ≥ 1
a1,(1,m)N1 + a2,(1,m)N2 + · · ·+ aK,(1,m)NK ≥ 1 (3)
Condition (3) lead to what is defined as ’strong’ winner. Replacing all the
1’s by 0’s lead to the definition of a ’weak’ winner. For small values n and
m , this probability can be computed using the multinomial distribution (1).
We are interested in finding
limn→∞ P (One of the Ci is a Condorcet winner) for a given value of m.
Several researchers have attempted to find this limit or an approximation
to it. Gilbaud [14] gave an expression of this limit for m = 3, when all the
pi’s are equal (Impartial Culture or IC model), though he did not explain
the method. Garmen and Kamien [9] derived the expression for the limiting
Condorcet winner probability for m = 3 and m = 4 for the Impartial Culture
model without giving details. Jones et al [17], Bell [2] and Niemi et al
[23] obtained approximations to it by extensive simulations or quadrature
methods attributed to Ruben [25] for the Impartial Culture (IC) model i.e.,
when all the preference rankings are equal.
Niemi and Weisberg [23] and Garman and Kamien [9] were the first to
relate the limit or an approximation to it with the calculation of certain
multivariate normal probabilities. Niemi et al [23] assume n to be an odd
number and Garman et al [9] indicate the relation in a footnote. However,
they do not present a rigorous statistical proof that the limit is exactly a mul-
tivariate normal probability for any general culture probabilities. They state
that the multivariate normality is achieved by the fact that the multinomial
distribution tends to the multivariate normal distribution. The multivariate
normality however, is the consequence of the fact that a set of linear com-
binations of Ni values, defined by equation (2), tends to the multivariate
normal distribution by the application of multivariate central limit theorem,
as we proceed to show here. In this section we show a rigorous statistical
derivation of the limit which covers the cases when n is odd or even.
Most researchers in this area have focused on the odd n (number of voters)
case. This is because ties do not occur while determining the majority rule;
i.e., for odd number of voters n, the number of voters preferring Ci to Cj
will never equal the voters preferring Cj to Ci. However, if n is even there
is a positive probability of having a tie. We show, in what follows, that the
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probability of a tie for n even tends to zero as n → ∞. Let pij =
∑
r
pr
the with summation extending over the preference rankings in which Ci is
preferred over Cj and let T denote the total number of voters preferring Ci
to Cj. Then, it is well known from Multinomial distribution theory that T
is a Binomial variable with n and pij as parameters. The probability of a tie
in the majority determination between Ci and Cj is
P (T =
n
2
) =
(
n
n
2
)
pij
n
2 (1− pij)
n
2
=
n!
(n
2
)!(n
2
)!
[pij(1− pij)]
n
2 (4)
We know by Stirling’s approximation [5] Page 130, that
n! ∼=
√
2pie−nnn+
1
2
The symbol ∼= means n!√
2pie−nnn+
1
2
→ 1 as n→∞. Applying this to equation
(4) and noting that pij(1− pij) ≤ 14 for all 0 ≤ pij ≤ 1, we can verify that
P (T =
n
2
) ∼= 1√
2pi
2n+1√
n
[pij(1− pij)]
n
2
≤ 1√
2npi
2n+1
4
n
2
=
√
2
pi
1√
n
→ 0 as n→∞
For a given voter v, for i = 1, · · · , m, j= 1, · · · , m, i 6= j, define
X(i, j, v) = 1 if CiPCj
= −1 if CjPCi (5)
For the voter profile (N1, N2, · · · , NK), CiMCj if
n∑
v=1
X(i, j, v) ≥ 1 . The
above representation has been used in Bell ([2]) and Gehrlein ([12]). Note
that
n∑
v=1
X(i, j, v) = a1,(i,j)N1 + a2,(i,j)N2 + · · ·+ aK,(i,j)NK
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We have,
λij = E(X(i, j, v))
= a1,(i,j)p1 + a2,(i,j)p2 + · · ·+ aK,(i,j)pK (6)
V ar(X(i, j, v)) = 1 − λ2ij (7)
We also need to obtain the correlation coefficient between X(i, j, v) and
X(i, l, v), i 6= j, i 6= l and j 6= l. To express correlation, we first define
ar,(i,j),l = 1 if in the preference ranking corresponding to Nr, r = 1, · · · , K is
CiPCj and CiPCl
or CjPCi and ClPCi
= −1 Otherwise (8)
Covariance is defined by the following equation.
Covariance(X(i, j, v), X(i, l, v)) = E[X(i, j, v)X(i, l, v)]− λijλil
The correlation between X(i, j, v) and X(i, l, v) is given by
R
(i)
jl =
E(X(i, j, v).X(i, l, v)) − λijλil√
(1− λ2ij)(1− λ2il)
j = 1, · · · , m,
l = 1, · · · , m and j 6= l, j 6= i, l 6= i.
=
K∑
r=1
ar,(i,j),lpr − λijλil√
(1− λ2ij)(1− λ2il)
For a given i = 1, 2, · · · , m, let Ri denote the (m−1)×(m−1) correlation
matrix (R
(i)
jl ). Note that R
(i)
jj = 1, j = 1, 2, · · · , m; j 6= i.
Let
y(i, j, v) =
(X(i, j, v)− λij)√
1− λ2ij
, j = 1, 2, · · · , m, j 6= i
and Zn(i, j) =
n∑
v=1
y(i, j, v)√
n
=
n∑
v=1
(X(i, j, v)− λij)√
n
√
1− λ2ij
, j = 1, · · · , m, j 6= i (9)
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Note that the (m − 1) random variables y(i, j, v), j = 1, · · · , m, j 6= i have
a joint distribution with zero mean vector, unit variances and Correlation
matrix Ri.
From (9), the probability that CiMCj is given by
P
(
n∑
v=1
X(i, j, v) ≥ 1
)
=⇒ P

Zn(i, j) ≥ (
1√
n
−√nλij)√
1− λ2ij

 . (10)
The probability that Ci is the Condorcet winner is therefore given by the
joint probability
P

Zn(i, j) ≥ (
1√
n
−√nλij)√
1− λ2ij
, j = 1, · · · , m, j 6= i

 . (11)
By the multivariate central limit theorem (See Crame`r [6], Page 112)
applied to independent summands Zn(i, j),j = 1, · · · , m, j 6= i, the joint
distribution of
(Zn(i, 1), · · · , Zn(i, i− 1), Zn(i, i+ 1), · · · , Zn(i,m))
tends as n→∞ to the (m−1) dimensional multivariate normal distribution
with zero mean vector, unit variances and correlation matrix Ri = (R
(i)
jl ).
Let us write
δij =


−∞ if λij > 0
∞ if λij < 0
0 if λij = 0
Denote by L(h1, h2, · · · , hm−1;R) the multivariate normal probability
P (Z∗1 ≥ h1, Z∗2 ≥ h2, · · · , Z∗m−1 ≥ hm−1;R)
where (Z∗1 , Z
∗
2 , · · · , Z∗m−1) has the multivariate normal distribution with zero
mean vector, unit variances and Correlation matrix R. Then we have
lim
n→∞
P

Zij > (
1√
n
−√nλij)√
1− λ2ij
, j = 1, · · · , m, i 6= j


= L(δi1, δi2, · · · , δi,i−1, δi,i+1, · · · , δim;Ri). (12)
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The limiting probability of a Condorcet winner is then
P (∞, m) =
m∑
i=1
L(δi1, δi2, · · · , δi,i−1, δi,i+1, · · · , δim;Ri). (13)
Equation (13) shows that the limiting Condorcet winner probability is
obtained as the sum of m L-functions. The arguments of the L functions are
either +∞ or−∞ or 0. If at least one of the arguments in a L function is +∞,
the function value is 0 by the definition of the L-function. We can also drop
all the arguments with value −∞ and calculate the reduced L-function from
the marginal multivariate normal distribution. It is therefore interesting to
note that even for arbitrary probability distribution pi’s, at worst we have to
evaluate positive orthant probabilities of a multivariate normal distribution.
We shall give examples for the case m = 3 and m = 4 in later sections and
provide a scheme to obtain the exact limiting probability expressions for a
Condorcet winner for any choice of pi’s.
Equation (13) can also be specialized to the Dual Culture(DC) Model. A
preference rank order is the dual of another ranking if each can be obtained
by reversing the order of the other. For example, if m = 4, rank order
C1C4C3C2 is dual to C2C3C4C1. The DC model assigns pi such that pi = pj
if i is dual to j. In this case it is clear from the definition of λij that all the
λij ≡ 0. This, in turn, implies that δij ≡ 0. Equation (13) shows then that
the limiting probability of a Condorcet winner under DC models
m∑
i=1
L(0, 0, 0, · · · , 0;Ri)
Note that in each L function, there are (m−1) zeroes. Gehrlein [11] gives
the exact expressions for m = 3 and m = 4.
3 Condorcet Winner: Some Special Cases
First we assume that all preference rankings for a voter are equally likely.
This implies that pi ≡ 1/K, for i = 1, · · · , K. For this case, symmetry
conditions imply that λij ≡ 0 for i = 1, · · · , m , j = 1, · · · , m and i 6= j
⇒ δij ≡ 0. For this case, it can be verified from [13] that Ri ≡ R∗ where
R∗ is the (m−1)×(m−1) equicorrelated matrix with equal correlation value
= 1/3. The limiting probability of a Condorcet winner from (13) is given by
P (∞, m) = mL(0, 0, · · · , 0;R∗) (14)
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This expression form = 3 was obtained by Gilbaud ([14]) as 3
4
+ 3
2pi
arcsin(1
3
).
Garman and Kamien [9] gave the expression form = 4 without giving details.
For m ≥ 5, several researchers have obtained approximate values for expres-
sion (14) based on simulation studies or by quadrature methods. See for
example Gehrlein [13], Jones et al [17] and Niemi et al [23]. The expression
(14) shows that the limiting probability for m candidates can be obtained
by an evaluation of positive orthant probabilities for a (m− 1) dimensional
multivariate normal distribution with zero mean vector, unit variances and
equicorrelated correlation matrix with all correlations equal to 1/3. Several
papers in the statistical literature deal with such evaluations. See, for exam-
ple, David and Mallows [7], Sondhi[26], Placket[24], Ruben[25], Johnson and
Kotz [16] and Bacon [1]. Bacon [1] derives explicit expressions for the positive
orthant probabilities for a few small values of m for a multivariate normal
distribution with equicorrelated correlation matrix with all correlations equal
to ρ. He also derives a recursive relation to calculate the probabilities for
successive values of m. Except for a few small values of m, such expressions
involve the evaluation of multiple integrals without known closed form ex-
pressions. Denote the expression (14) by P (m). Using the expressions from
Bacon [1], Gehrlein [10] obtains the values of P (m) for some small values of
m as
m = 3, P (3) = 3
4
+ 3
2pi
arcsin(1
3
)
m = 4, P (4) = 1
2
[1 + 6
pi
arcsin(1
3
)]
m = 5, P (5) = 5
16
[1 + 12
pi
arcsin(1
3
) + 24
pi2
∫ 1
3
0 arcsin(
λ
1+2λ
) dλ√
(1−λ2)
]
m = 6, P (6) = 3
16
[1 + 20
pi
arcsin(1
3
) + 120
pi2
∫ 1
3
0 arcsin(
λ
1+2λ
) dλ√
(1−λ2)
]
m = 7, P (7) = 7
64
[1 + 30
pi
arcsin(1
3
) + 360
pi2
∫ 1
3
0 arcsin(
λ
1+2λ
) dλ√
(1−λ2)
+720
pi3
∫ 1
3
0
∫ µ
1+2µ
0 arcsin(
λ
1+2λ
) dλ√
(1−λ2)
dµ√
(1−µ2)
]
Note however, that some of these expressions involve integrals.
Denote L(0, 0, · · · , 0, ρ) by Lm−1(ρ) when there are m − 1 zeros in the
argument of L and ρ is the common correlation. From the results of Sampford
(See Moran [21]) we have
Lm−1(ρ) =
1√
pi
∫ ∞
−∞
e−t
2
(1− Φ(at))m−1dt
where Φ(.) is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal
distribution and a = 2ρ
1−ρ . For the IC model, ρ =
1
3
and hence a = 1. Thus
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Lm−1(0, · · · , 0; 1
3
) =
1√
pi
∫ ∞
−∞
e−t
2
(1− Φ(t))m−1dt (15)
It is also known that Lm−1(ρ) form being even can be obtained recursively
from Li(ρ) for i ≤ m− 2:
Lm−1(ρ) =
1
2
[−(m− 1)
2
+ 1 +
(
m− 1
2
)
L2(ρ)−
(
m− 1
3
)
L3(ρ) + · · ·+
(
m− 1
m− 2
)
Lm−2(ρ)
]
(16)
See Johnson and Kotz [16] Pages 48-52 for more details. We obtained the
expression for m = 6 using the recursion formula.
Form > 7, Bacon [1] provides an approximation believed to be reasonably
close to the true value. Figure 1 shows the plot of P (m) for increasing values
of m based on these approximations. May [19] has shown that P (m)→ 0, as
m→∞ at the rate of 1
m
. His proof is based on saddle point approximation
of an integral and it appears to be complicated and difficult to understand.
We present a direct proof of this result.
From (14) and (15), we have
P (m) =
m√
pi
[∫ ∞
−∞
e−t
2
(1− Φ(t))m−1dt
]
=
√
2m
[∫ ∞
−∞
φ(t)(1− Φ(t))m−1e−t
2
2 dt
]
where
φ(t) = (
1√
2pi
)e
−t2
2 =
d
dt
Φ(t)
P (m) =
√
2m



−(1− Φ(t))
me
−t2
2
m


∞
−∞
− 1
m
∫ ∞
−∞
[1− Φ(t)]mte−t
2
2 dt


= −
√
2
∫ ∞
−∞
[1− Φ(t)]me−t
2
4 te
−t2
4 dt
Applying Cauchy-Schwarz’s inequality∣∣∣∣
∫
f(t)g(t)dt
∣∣∣∣ ≤
(∫
f 2(t)dt
) 1
2
(∫
g2(t)dt
) 1
2
(17)
to the above equation, we get
P (m) ≤
√
2
(∫ ∞
−∞
(1− Φ(t))2me−t
2
2 dt
) 1
2
(∫ ∞
−∞
t2e
−t2
2 dt
) 1
2
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Note that∫ ∞
−∞
(1− Φ(t))2me−t
2
2 dt =
√
2pi
∫ ∞
−∞
(1− Φ(t))2mφ(t)dt
=
√
2pi
2m+ 1∫ ∞
−∞
t2e
−t2
2 dt =
√
2pi
∫ ∞
−∞
t2φ(t)dt
=
√
2pi
Thus
P (m) ≤ 2pi
√
2
1
(2m+ 1)
1
2
→ 0 as m→∞
We proved that the limiting probability P (m) of a Condorcet winner
tends to zero as m → ∞. We show in addition thatP (m) is monotonically
decreasing in m. This settles Kelly’s [18] and Buckley and Westen’s [4]
conjecture for large values of n. This monotonicity property, we believe, is
new.
Proposition: P (m+ 1) < P (m)
Proof: From Equations (14) and (15), we have to show that
(m+ 1)√
pi
∫ ∞
−∞
e−t
2
(1− Φ(t))mdt < m√
pi
∫ ∞
−∞
e−t
2
(1− Φ(t))m−1dt (18)
(m+ 1)√
pi
∫ ∞
−∞
e−t
2
(1− Φ(t))mdt =
√
2(m+ 1)
∫ ∞
−∞
e
−t2
2 (1− Φ(t))mφ(t)dt
(19)
where φ(t) = pdf of standard normal distribution. The right side of equation
(19) equals after integrating by parts
−
√
2
∫ ∞
−∞
te
−t2
2 (1− Φ(t))m+1dt
Similarly the right side of equation (18) equals
−
√
2
∫ ∞
−∞
te
−t2
2 (1− Φ(t))mdt
13
Thus it is enough to show
∫ ∞
−∞
te
−t2
2
(
(1− Φ(t))m+1 − (1− Φ(t))m
)
dt > 0
Split the region of integration into
∫ 0
−∞+
∫∞
0 ,put t = −y in the first integral
and after simplification and noting 1 − Φ(−y) = Φ(y), it reduces to show
that∫ ∞
0
[(
(1− Φ(y))m+1 − (1− Φ(y))m
)
−
(
Φm+1(y)− Φm(y)
)]
yφ(y)dy > 0
(20)
We have written Φm+1(y) for Φ(y)m+1 and Φm(y) for Φ(y)m. We will
show that
(Φm(y)− (1− Φ(y))m)−
(
Φm+1(y)− (1− Φ(y))m+1
)
> 0 for y > 0 (21)
Write Φ(y) = z and note that the left hand side of equation (21) equals
(2z−1)
[
zm−1 + zm−2(1− z) + · · ·+ (1− z)m−1
]
−(2z−1)
[
zm + zm−1(1− z) + · · ·+ (1− z)m
]
(22)
Observe that 2z − 1 > 0 for y > 0.
Note that zm−1 − zm−1(1− z) = zm. Further,
zm−2(1− z)− zm−2(1− z)2 = zm−1(1− z)
and so on.
Hence the expression in the square brackets of equation (20)
= zm−1(1− z) + zm−2(1− z)2 + · · ·+ z(1− z)m−1 > 0
Thus the integrand in equation (20) is >0 and hence the left side of equation
(20) is > 0.
4 Condorcet Winner: Special Case m = 3
candidates
Niemi et al [23] calculated the limiting probability of a Condorcet winner
values for n = 1..49, utilizing the table of Ruben [25]. Ruben used quadra-
ture methods and recursive formulas to obtain these values. May [19] and
14
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Figure 1: The plot of limiting Probability of a Condorcet winner vs the
number of Candidates
Garman et al [9] discussed the case of 3 candidates to obtain the limiting
probability of a Condorcet winner. Gehrlein [11] discusses several possibili-
ties that may arise in obtaining the value for m = 3. We give a compact and
complete Table for all possible pi’s utilizing the results of Section 2 and (13)
of this paper. Suppose the 6 rankings are
Rankings Number of Voters Probabilities
C1C2C3 N1 p1
C1C3C2 N2 p2
C2C1C3 N3 p3
C2C3C1 N4 p4
C3C1C2 N5 p5
C3C2C1 N6 p6
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It can be verified that
λ12 = p1 + p2 + p5 − p3 − p4 − p6
λ13 = p1 + p2 + p3 − p4 − p5 − p6
λ21 = p3 + p4 + p6 − p1 − p2 − p5
λ23 = p1 + p3 + p4 − p2 − p5 − p6
λ31 = p4 + p5 + p6 − p1 − p2 − p3
λ32 = p2 + p5 + p6 − p1 − p3 − p4
The three correlation matrices R1, R2, R3 are given by:
R1 =

 1
(p1+p2+p4+p6−p3−p5)−λ12λ13√
(1−λ2
12
)(1−λ2
13
)
(p1+p2+p4+p6−p3−p5)−λ12λ13√
(1−λ2
12
)(1−λ2
13
)
1


The (1,2) entry of R1 is R
1
23.
R2 =

 1
(p2+p3+p4+p5−p1−p6)−λ21λ23√
(1−λ2
21
)(1−λ2
23
)
(p2+p3+p4+p5−p1−p6)−λ21λ23√
(1−λ2
21
)(1−λ2
23
)
1


The (1,2) entry of R2 is R
2
13.
R3 =

 1
(p1+p3+p5+p6−p2−p4)−λ31λ32√
(1−λ2
31
)(1−λ2
32
)
(p1+p3+p5+p6−p2−p4)−λ31λ32√
(1−λ2
31
)(1−λ2
32
)
1


The (1,2) entry of R3 is R
3
12. The probability of a Condorcet winner is
L(δ12, δ13, R
1
23) + L(δ21, δ23, R
2
13) + L(δ31, δ32, R
3
12). (23)
By considering the 27 possibilities with which λ12, λ13 and λ23 can take zero,
positive and negative values, we can simplify the expression further. Table
1 shows the 27 possible cases and the corresponding limiting value of the
probability of a Condorcet winner. A set of different values is obtained for
varying values of pi’s. It is also to be noted that for a few alternatives the
values of 0 and 1 are obtained for the limiting probability of a Condorcet
winner. See alternatives 7 and 17 in Table 1. Table 1 provides the reference
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table to calculate the exact limiting probability for any choice of pi, i =
1, · · · , 6. One of the 27 possibilities will apply in a given situation and one
can read off or calculate the value. It is seen from Table 1 that only in two
cases out of 27, the limiting probability is definitely 0. In 12 cases (more
than 40%) the probability is 1 and in almost all cases the probability will be
at least 50%. These observations are consistent with often stated conclusion
that for small number of candidates and large number of votes, the Condercet
scheme will produce a winner.
It can be verified that case 7, for example, is reached when p1 = p2 =
p5 =
1
6
; p3 =
2
5
and p6 =
1
10
. Case 17 is reached when p1 =
3
22
,p2 =
3
22
,p3 =
9
44
,p4 =
13
44
, p5 =
5
22
and p6 = 0. For another set of examples for m = 3, see
May [19], Garman et al [9] and Meyer et al [20].
For example, the trivial set of probabilities pi = 1, pj = 0, j 6= i will
produce a Condorcet winner for every n and hence the limit is also 1 as n→
∞. Choose the probabilities pi such that C1C2C3C4 · · ·Cm, C2C3C1C4 · · ·Cm,
C3C1C2C4 · · ·Cm have probabilities 13 each and the rest of the rankings have
probabilities 0. It is easily verified that λ12 =
1
3
, λ13 =
−1
3
, λ23 =
1
3
, λ1j =
λ2j = λ3j = 1 for all j ≥ 4. This implies that δ13 =∞, δ12 = δ23 = −∞, δ1j =
δ2j = δ3j = −∞, for j ≥ 4. From equation (12), it follows immediately that
in every L term, one of the arguments is a +∞. This implies that the limiting
Condorcet winner probability is 0. Thus for every m, we can choose pi so
that the limiting Condorcet winner is 0.
Gillett[15] conjectured that the probability of a Condorcet winner P (3, n; p)
for m = 3 candidates and any n, the number of voters, is minimized for
p1 = p4 = p5 =
1
3
, p2 = p3 = p6 = 0 or p1 = p4 = p5 = 0, p2 = p3 = p6 =
1
3
.
Buckley [3] proved this conjecture for the special case n = 3. We will show
the validity of the conjecture for general n.
The probability of candidate C1 being the majority winner is
P
{
N1 +N2 +N3 >
n
2
and N1 +N2 +N5 >
n
2
}
= P
{
N1 +N2 >
n
2
−min(N3, N5)
}
≥ P
{
N1 +N2 >
n
2
}
,
since N3 and N4 are non-negative random variables. The above expression
is greater than or equal to
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P
{
N1 >
n
2
}
, again for the same reason with regard to N2. N1 is dis-
tributed as a Binomial variable with n and p1.
P
(
N1 >
n
2
)
= 1−B(k;n, p1)
where B(k;n, p1) is the Binomial cumulative distribution with parameters n
and p1. k =
n−1
2
if n is odd and k = n
2
if n is even. From the relation of
B(k;n, p1) with Incomplete Beta function, see Feller(1957) page 127, [8],
P (N1 >
n
2
) = n
(
n− 1
k
) ∫ p1
0
tk(1− t)n−k−1dt (24)
Continuing similar arguments for C2 and C3 being majority winners, we
have
P (3, n;p) ≥ n
(
n− 1
k
) [∫ p1
0
tk(1− t)n−k−1dt+
∫ p4
0
tk(1− t)n−k−1dt +
∫ p5
0
tk(1− t)n−k−1dt
]
Consider minimizing the following function
u(p1, p4, p5) =
∫ p1
0
tk(1− t)n−k−1dt+
∫ p4
0
tk(1− t)n−k−1dt
+
∫ p5
0
tk(1− t)n−k−1dt
subject to p1 + p4 + p5 = c
p1 ≥ 0, p4 ≥ 0, p5 ≥ 0 where c = 1− (p2 + p3 + p6) (25)
We proceed to show that an optimal solution to the problem defined by
(25) is given by p1 = p4 = p5 =
c
3
.
u(p1, p4, p5) is a separable function in p1, p4 and p5. It can be verified
that
∂2u(p1, p4, p5)
∂pi2
= pi
k−1(1− pin−k−2) (k − (n− 1)pi)) , i = 1, 4, 5 (26)
For pi ≤ kn−1 , i = 1, 4, 5, ∂
2u
∂pi2
≥ 0 =⇒ u(p1, p4, p5) is convex in pi in the region
of pi’s.
In order that pi’s satisfy the constraints of equation(25), we cannot have
two of the pi’s are ≥ kn−1 with at least one of them > kn−1 , since their sum
will be greater than 2k
n−1 ≥ 1 for both n even and n odd. If for any feasible
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solution, a single pi >
k
n−1 , which implies that the other two <
k
n−1 , the
Hessian matrix will have its determinant a negative value because of equation
(26). Note that the Hessian is a diagonal matrix. Thus such a solution cannot
be a local minimum. Therefore we can confine our solution to the region in
which all the pi’s ≤ kn−1 . It is easy to verify that p1 = p4 = p5 = c3 satisfies
the Kuhn-Tucker condition for the minimum. Note also that c
3
< k
(n−1) , since
3k
(n−1) > 1. Since u(p1, p4, p5) is convex in this region, the solution is a global
minimum of u(p1, p4, p5).
Fix now p1 = p4 = p5 =
c
3
and repeat the whole argument with p2, p3, p6 as
variables and consider the minimization problem of minimizing the following
function.
w(p2, p3, p6) =
∫ p2
0
tk(1− t)n−k−1dt+
∫ p3
0
tk(1− t)n−k−1dt
+
∫ p6
0
tk(1− t)n−k−1dt
subject to p2 + p3 + p6 = 1− c
p2 ≥ 0, p3 ≥ 0, p6 ≥ 0 where c = (p1 + p4 + p5) (27)
As before, the minimum solution of equation (27) is p2 = p3 = p6 =
1−c
3
for p1 = p4 = p5 =
c
3
. From equation (27), we see that the least value
of w(p3, p3, p6) is when c = 1. Thus the minimum solution is p1 = p4 =
p5 =
1
3
; p2 = p3 = p6 = 0. Note that our arguments show that p2 = p3 =
p6 =
1
3
; p1 = p4 = p5 = 0 is also optimal. Denote by p˜
∗ the solution
p1
∗ = p4
∗ = p5
∗ = 1
3
; p2
∗ = p3
∗ = p6
∗ = 0. Let u∗(p1
∗, p4
∗, p5
∗) be the value
of the objective function of (25). We have shown that for any choice of p˜
P (3, n; p˜) ≥ n
(
n− 1
k
)
u∗(p1
∗, p4
∗, p5
∗)
= 3(1− B(k;n, 1
3
)), from (22)
We will now show that P (3, n; p˜∗) = 3(1 − B(k;n, 1
3
)) which concludes
that p˜∗ yields the minimum value of P (3, n; p˜). Since p2
∗ = p3
∗ = p6
∗ = 0,
we have
P (3, n; p˜∗) = P (N1 >
n
2
, N1 +N5 >
n
2
)
+ P (N4 >
n
2
, N4 +N1 >
n
2
)
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+ P (N5 >
n
2
, N5 +N4 >
n
2
)
= P (N1 >
n
2
) + P (N4 >
n
2
) + P (N5 >
n
2
)
= 3(1−B(k;n, 1
3
),
since N1, N4, N5 are identically Binomial distributed with parameters n and
1
3
.
This establishes the conjecture. Note that the minimum value for the
probability of a Condorcet winner is given by
3
(
1− B(k;n, 1
3
)
)
or an equivalent integral representation
3n
(
n− 1
k
)[∫ 1
3
0
tk(1− t)n−k−1dt
]
The former is easier to evaluate for small values of n and employ a normal
approximation to the Binomial for large n. For example, when n = 3, the
minimum probability is
3
((
3
2
)(
1
3
)2 (2
3
)
+
(
3
3
)(
1
3
)3)
=
7
9
which is about 77%. For n = 4, the minimum probability of a Condorcet
winner is
3
((
4
3
)(
1
3
)3 (2
3
)
+
(
4
4
)(
1
3
)4)
=
1
3
which drops down to 33%.
The foregoing arguments can be generalized to m > 3 candidates. Con-
sider the probability distribution p˜∗ on m! preference rank orders given by
assigning probability of 1
m
to each of the cyclic rank orders
rank order 1, 2, · · · , (m− 1), m probability p1
rank order 2, 3, · · · , m, 1 probability p2
rank order 3, 4, · · · , 1, 2 probability p3
· · · · · ·
rank order m, 1, · · · , (m− 2), (m− 1) probability pm (28)
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We will establish that this solution yields the minimum for the probability of
a Condorcet winner P (m,n; p˜) for a general probability distribution p˜. We
use the same approach that was used for m = 3 case. It is shown first along
similar lines that
P (m,n; p˜) ≥ P (N1 > n
2
) + P (N2 >
n
2
) + · · ·+ P (Nm > n
2
) (29)
= n
(
n− 1
k
)[
m∑
i=1
∫ pi
0
tk(1− t)n−k−1dt
]
(30)
From an argument similar to the case m = 3, it is shown that
P (m,n; p˜) ≥ m(1− B(k;n, 1
m
)). (31)
Next it follows that from (28) and the definition of a Condorcet winner,
P (m,n; p˜∗) for p˜∗ given by pi
∗ = 1
m
, for i = 1, · · · , m and pi∗ = 0 for
i ≥ (m+ 1) the probability of C1 winning is
P (N1 +N3 + · · ·+Nm > n
2
, N1 +N4 + · · ·+Nm > n
2
,
· · · , N1 > n
2
)
= P (N1 >
n
2
)
Similarly it is verified that the probability of C2 winning is
P (N1 +N2 +N4 + · · ·+Nm > n
2
, N1 +N2 +N5 + · · ·+Nm > n
2
,
· · · , N2 > n
2
)
= P (N2 >
n
2
)
and so on. Hence
P (m,n; p˜∗) = P (N1 >
n
2
) + P (N2 >
n
2
) + · · ·+ P (Nm > n
2
)
= m(1 −B(k;n, 1
m
))
which equals the bound in (31). Hence p˜∗ yields the minimum for the prob-
ability of a Condorcet winner. Table 2 gives the minimum probability of a
Condorcet winner for selected values of m and n.
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5 Condorcet Winner: Special Case m=4 can-
didates
For this case, we show that it is possible to obtain, for any choice of pi, i =
1, 2, · · · , 24, exact limiting probability of a Condorcet winner. We first cal-
culate the six quantities λ12, λ13, λ14, λ23, λ24 and λ34 from (6). Then define
δ12, δ13, δ14, δ23, δ24 and δ34 as stated in Section 2. Also calculate the correla-
tion matrices Ri, i = 1, 2, 3, 4. In this case, there are 3
6 = 729 possibilities
for the λij’s to be > 0 or < 0 or = 0. It will be unwieldy to prepare a Table
containing all these 729 cases. We show how the limiting probability can
be calculated for any given situation. The limiting probability of Condorcet
winner follows from (13).
P (∞, 4) = L(δ12, δ13, δ14;R1) + L(δ21, δ23, δ24;R2)
+L(δ31, δ32, δ34;R3) + L(δ41, δ42, δ43;R4)
Consider the calculation of L(δ12, δ13, δ14;R1). Calculations for other L-
factors are similar. To obtain this, we need at the worst to calculate L(0, 0, 0;R1)
or L(0, 0, R1ij) or L(0). Recall the definition of R
1
ij as appropriate i, j element
of R1. Note that L(0) = Φ(0) =
1
2
, where Φ is the cdf of the standard normal
distribution. Bacon [1] gives exact expressions for those L functions as
L(0, 0, R1ij) =
1
4
+
1
2pi
arcsin(R1ij)
L(0, 0, 0, R1) =
1
8
[
1 +
2
pi
(
arcsin(R123) + arcsin(R
1
24) + arcsin(R
1
34)
)]
The calculation of this L for other possible arguments is by inspection or it
will reduce to one of the above 3 cases with arguments equal to zero.
This example illustrates the comment made immediately after equation
(13) that the only calculations, if any, involve calculating the positive orthant
probabilities of appropriate multivariate normal distribution. Thus for any
one of the 729 possibilities that is reached in a given case, we can calculate
the exact limiting probability of a Condorcet winner.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we provide a rigorous mathematical treatment for calculating
the limiting probability of a Condorcet winner for any number of candidates
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and with arbitrary rank order probabilities, when the voters are independent.
We show further that the limiting probability depends only on the positive
orthant probabilities of an appropriate multinormal distribution even for ar-
bitrary probabilities of the preference rank order probabilities. We provide
approximate limiting probabilities for a Condorcet winner for any number of
candidates and equal rank order probabilities. We provide a compact and
complete Table for the limiting probability of a Condorcet winner with 3
candidates and arbitrary rank order probabilities. We present a simple proof
of a result of May [19] to show that the limiting probability of a Condorcet
winner tends to zero as the number of candidates tends to infinity. We also
present a scheme for calculating the exact limiting probability for m = 4
candidates and arbitrary probability distributions on the preference rank or-
ders. We show for the first time that the limiting probability of a Condorcet
winner for any given number of candidates m is monotone decreasing in m
for the equally likely case. This, in turn, settles the conjectures of Kelly [18]
and Buckley and Westen [4] for the case n → ∞. We prove the validity of
Gillett’s [15] conjecture on the minimum value of the probability of a Con-
dorcet winner for m = 3 and any n. Extending the result we obtain the
minimum value and the minimum solution for any n and m.
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Number λ12 λ13 λ23 Probability of a Winner
1 0 0 0 1
4
+ 1
2pi
arcsin(R123) +
1
4
+ 1
2pi
arcsin(R213) +
1
4
+ 1
2pi
arcsin(R312)
2 0 0 + 1
2
+ 1
4
+ 1
2pi
arcsin(R123)
3 0 0 - 1
2
+ 1
4
+ 1
2pi
arcsin(R123)
4 0 + 0 1
2
+ 1
4
+ 1
2pi
arcsin(R213)
5 0 - 0 1
2
+ 1
4
+ 1
2pi
arcsin(R213)
6 0 + - 1
2
7 0 + + 1
8 0 - + 1
2
9 0 - - 1
10 + 0 + 1
2
11 + + 0 1
12 + 0 - 1
13 + - 0 1
2
14 + + + 1
15 + - - 1
16 + + - 1
17 + - + 0
18 + 0 0 1
2
+ 1
4
+ 1
2pi
arcsin(R312)
19 - 0 0 1
2
+ 1
4
+ 1
2pi
arcsin(R312)
20 - 0 + 1
21 - 0 - 1
2
22 - + 0 1
2
23 - + + 1
24 - + - 0
25 - - 0 1
26 - - + 1
27 - - - 1
Table 1: Limiting Condorcet Winner Probabilities for m = 3 candidates
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n m = 3 m = 4 m = 5 m = 10
3 0.7778 0.6250 0.5200 0.2800
4 0.3333 0.2031 0.1360 0.0370
5 0.6296 0.4141 0.2896 0.0856
6 0.3004 0.1504 0.0848 0.0127
7 0.5199 0.2822 0.1667 0.0273
8 0.2638 0.1092 0.0520 0.0043
9 0.4345 0.1957 0.0979 0.0089
10 0.2297 0.0789 0.0318 0.0015
19 0.1943 0.0356 0.0079 0.0000
20 0.1129 0.0158 0.0028 0.0000
29 0.0934 0.0071 0.0007 0.0000
30 0.0564 0.0033 0.0003 0.0000
50 0.0148 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000
51 0.0207 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000
100 0.0006 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
101 0.0008 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Table 2: Minimum Condorcet Winner Probabilities for some values of m and
n
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